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1ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the role of discount travel agencies such as Priceline and Hotwire in
the market segmentation of the hotel and airline industries. These agencies conceal important
characteristics of the o®ered services, such as hotel locations or °ight schedules. We explicitly
model this opaque feature and show that it enables service providers to price discriminate between
those customers who are sensitive to service characteristics and those who are not. Service providers
can pro¯t from such discrimination despite the fact that the opaque feature virtually erases product
di®erentiation and thus intensi¯es competition. The reason is that the intensi¯ed competition for
less sensitive customers enables service providers to commit to a higher price for more sensitive
customers, which leads to higher pro¯ts overall. This explains why airlines or hotels are willing to
lose the advantage of product di®erentiation and o®er services through discount travel agencies.
Keywords: market segmentation, opaque travel agency, separation equilibrium, price discrim-
ination.
Jel Classification: D43, D82, L11, M31
21 Introduction
In the past few years, the emergence of online electronic markets dramatically changed the leisure
travel industry, making it one of the most developed online businesses. In the United States, online
leisure travel bookings more than tripled from 2001 to 2005,1 and are expected to reach about
$69 billion in 2007, or 35% of all online consumer spending.2 According to PhoCusWright, an
independent consultancy, online leisure travel bookings in the United States will surpass o²ine
bookings in volume for the ¯rst time in 2007.3
Expedia (who owns Expedia.com and Hotels.com), Travelocity and Orbitz are the three domi-
nant online travel agencies (OTAs). Two niche players, Hotwire.com (acquired by Expedia in 2003)
and Priceline.com, have emerged that o®er services with 30 ¡ 50% price discounts as compared to
o²ine reservation prices or prices of other OTAs. These discount agencies have gained sizeable
market shares. According to MarketMetrix, Priceline and Hotwire combined account for 6:7% of
worldwide online hotel bookings in 2006, comparable to Expedia.com (10:4%), Travelocity.com
(6:8%) and Orbitz.com (4:9%).4;5 In November 2007, Priceline reported a gross pro¯t of $479 mil-
lion and gross travel bookings of $3:6 billon worldwide for the ¯rst three quarters (a 58:9%and
40:6% increase compared to the same period in 2006, respectively).6
The de¯ning feature of Priceline and Hotwire is that they do not tell customers certain itinerary
details, such as brand, the time of °ight departure or exact hotel location, until the transaction
is completed, and thus they are often referred to as \opaque" travel sites.7 Both sites used to
o®er opaque services exclusively. Recently, Priceline (in 2003) and Hotwire (in 2005) introduced
the traditional transparent retail option with disclosed prices and itinerary details. When o®ering
opaque services, the opaque agency is the merchant of record and are responsible for setting prices
1Source: New York Times. (Late Edition (East Coast)). May 30, 2005. pg. C.6.
2Source: http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=1545. Press release of comScore.com from July 30,
2007.
3Source: http://store.phocuswright.com/phuontrovsee.html. PhoCusWright's U.S. Online Travel Overview, 2007.
4Source: MarketMetrics.com, http://marketmetrix.com/en/default.aspx?s=research&p=research6.
5These ¯gures likely underestimate the importance of Priceline and Hotwire in the leisure travel market because
they include ¯ve-star hotels that are usually not o®ered by opaque sites (with the exception of Las Vegas). The ¯gures
also include sales in small cities where it is infeasible for opaque sites to operate | opaque sites need su±ciently
many participating hotels to form an opaque product.
6Priceline.com 2007 Q3 report, Form 10-Q, p. 23 and p. 26.
7There is a slight di®erence between the two sites. Hotwire discloses the prices for opaque hotels or car rentals
so consumers do not bid and simply decide whether to buy or not. Priceline, on the other hand, asks consumers to
\Name Your Own Price" for the opaque service requested.
3and the revenues generated are called \merchant revenues". In contrast, the revenues generated
from the traditional retail services are primarily \agency revenues", where the price is set by
the service providers and the opaque agency charges commissions. Opaque sales remain de¯ning
identity and major revenue source for both sites. In 2006, for example, Priceline reported that the
merchant revenues \represented the substantial majority of our total revenues".8
The opaque feature of Priceline and Hotwire has a strong impact on the competition between
service providers. When the complete information about °ights (or hotels) is available they are dif-
ferentiated products. Hotels di®er from each other in their identity, locations and amenities; °ights
di®er in their departure times, the number of connections, and the length of layovers. It is well-
known that product di®erentiation reduces competition and increases prices and pro¯t (Hotelling
(1929)). In contrast, products sold through Priceline and Hotwire are indistinguishable for cus-
tomers and become essentially perfect substitutes, which leads to Bertrand competition and drives
down both price-cost margin and ¯rms' pro¯t.
The question is then: why would hotels and airline companies be willing to sell their products
through Priceline/Hotwire and lose the advantage (and pro¯t) that product di®erentiation gives
them?
One explanation is that ¯rms use OTAs with the opaque feature to response to changes in
demand without jeopardizing existing branding and pricing policies (formalized in Wang et al.
(2006)). While this may be a part of the story we believe that this does not capture the whole
picture. First, Priceline and Hotwire o®er tickets during peak seasons (such as Christmas) and
to popular destinations where the demand is traditionally high. Second, the amount of concealed
information is more than the hotel or airline's identity, which also suggests that the purpose of
these agencies is more than only a facility to anonymously respond to demand changes.
Another possible explanation is that opaque sites can help sellers reach new consumers with low
valuations who otherwise remain outside the market. The low price of opaque services enables sellers
to attract low value customers who are sensitive to price but less sensitive to service characteristics.
On the other hand, the opaque feature prevents high value customers from switching to opaque
channels because they would prefer to know itinerary details.
While this explanation is quite possible, we show that opaque agencies enable hotels and airlines
to do much more than just attract low value consumers with cheap prices. In our model, they act
as a \collusion device" to facilitate price discrimination between di®erent types of customers and
8Priceline.com 2005 annual report Form 10-Q, p. 4, and 2006 annual report, Form 10-Q, p. 2.
4increase overall pro¯ts, even when the total market demand is perfectly inelastic.
We study the role of opaque travel agencies by using a variation of the Hotelling model. A model
of horizontal di®erentiation is appropriate in this setting because both hotel and airline competitions
are among service providers with similar qualities. First, Priceline and Hotwire disclose the star-
ratings for hotels' service quality and amenities, so the competition is largely among hotels with
similar qualities. Second, there is little quality di®erence among major airlines who provide the
substantial majority of tickets to opaque sites.9 In particular, all tickets sold through opaque
agencies are economy (coach) class only. Furthermore, Priceline promises that °ights have at most
one stop each way, the layover is no longer than three hours, and no red-eye or o®-peak °ight are
o®ered unless the traveler agrees to take one.
In the paper, we assume that there is a circle-shaped city where N hotels are located (Salop
(1979)). Consumers have two-dimensional types: location and transportation cost. Consumers'
location type comes from the standard Hotelling model and is continuous. The transportation cost
is binary { either high or low. We refer to consumers with a high transportation cost as business
travelers, and a low transportation cost as leisure travelers.
We depart from the standard Hotelling's framework by explicitly modeling the opaque feature
of Priceline and Hotwire. In our model, there is a single opaque travel agency that posts hotel prices
and withholds hotel identities. Customers can make a reservation either via standard (non-opaque)
travel agencies, or using the opaque travel agency. In the former case, customers can choose a
speci¯c hotel, and other things being equal, they would like to stay at the hotel that is closest to
their preferred location. In the latter case, customers do not know the hotel's location and they
simply prefer the hotel with the lowest price.
For a particular range of parameter values, we show that having an agency with the opaque
feature enables hotels to separate high-type (business) travelers from low-type (leisure) travelers and
to gain from this separation. The source of this gain comes from price discrimination. Without the
opaque agency, hotels compete for both high and low-type travelers through non-opaque reservation
systems. The presence of the low-type in this market intensi¯es the competition and drives down
the equilibrium price and pro¯t. When an opaque travel agency (like Priceline or Hotwire) is
introduced, a new equilibrium arises where high-type customers prefer to be served by agencies
without the opaque feature and pay a high non-opaque price. Low-type customers, on the other
9Five largest airline suppliers accounted for 82% of total tickets sold at Priceline in 2006. See Priceline.com 2006
annual report, p. 16.
5hand, are served by the opaque agency that charges lower prices. The competition through the
opaque agency is described by a Bertrand model, and so in the new equilibrium, hotel's competition
for the low-type increases. However, competition in the more lucrative segment of the market |
high-type travelers | decreases. It is still a Hotelling competition, but hotels no longer compete
for the low-type. Only high-type customers buy di®erentiated products and in the equilibrium
the non-opaque price is higher. Consequently, as long as there is a su±cient number of high-type
travelers, ¯rms' overall pro¯t increases.
Importantly, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, it is the intensi¯ed competition for the low-
type which enables hotels to decrease competition for the high-type. Leisure customers enjoy high
surplus when being charged low opaque prices. To attract them to the non-opaque sector, a hotel
would have to decrease the price too much to be pro¯table. As a result, in equilibrium hotels can
sustain the high price of the non-opaque sector since they no longer use it to compete for leisure
travelers.
The contribution of our paper is threefold. First, we formally model the opaque feature of
Priceline.com and Hotwire.com and investigate its impact on the competition of the travel industry.
Second, within our framework we ¯nd conditions on the degree of opacity that enables hotels and
airlines to price discriminate using opaque OTAs. We show that the opacity level cannot be either
too high or too low. If the opacity level is too high, leisure travelers would prefer to use standard
reservation systems, while if the opacity level is too low, business travelers would ¯nd it optimal
to purchase the opaque good. This ¯nding is consistent with the fact that Priceline/Hotwire do
not o®er hotel rooms in small towns and divide large cities into zones. Third, our analysis helps
explain why hotels and airlines are willing to use opaque channels to distribute their products.
In particular, we identify the set of parameters for which the introduction of the opaque agency
increases the overall pro¯ts of the industry.
2 Literature Review
In the literature there are only a few papers that focus on the e®ect of the opaque feature of
Priceline and Hotwire. Most of them, like Wang, Gal-Or and Chatterjee (2006), conduct analysis
in the monopolistic setting, whereas we explicitly model the competition in the travel industry. To
our knowledge, Fay (2006) is the only paper that models the opaque feature in the competitive
environment. In his model, there are two ¯rms and two types of consumers: those who are always
6loyal to a particular ¯rm, and those whose preferences are distributed along the line between two
¯rms as in the Hotelling model. The transportation cost of all consumers of the second type is the
same.
Our paper is di®erent from Fay (2006) in several aspects. First of all, we consider a more general
framework with any number of ¯rms. Here the number of ¯rms can be interpreted as the degree
of opacity of the products o®ered by discount agencies. Consequently, we are able to study the
e®ect of opacity degree on the equilibrium prices with opaque OTAs. Second, we do not have loyal
customers. Each consumer determines endogenously where to buy, and in particular, high-type
customers might purchase the opaque product when it is cheap enough. Thus, in our framework
we allow for a possibility that the opaque agency will cannibalize the pro¯t of standard reservation
systems.10 In contrast, cannibalization cannot happen in the model with loyal customers who only
buy non-opaque products. Finally, the opaque agency in Fay (2006) always reduces ¯rms' pro¯t.
Thus transfers from the opaque intermediary to ¯rms are required in order for them to be willing
to sell goods through the intermediary. In our setting, there are a range of parameter values when
¯rms' pro¯t strictly increases without any transfers.
Our approach is related to the Deneckere and McAfee (1996) paper on damaged goods. They
show that producers can intentionally damage a portion of their good in order to price discriminate.
Similarly, the opaque feature of Priceline and Hotwire is like damaging the original product by
hiding important characteristics of a °ight or a room. It then enables ¯rms to discriminate between
di®erent types of consumers. Our model, however, is di®erent from Deneckere and McAfee (1996)
in two dimensions. First, we analyze a competitive market rather than a monopoly. Second, the
damaging practice is done through a third party: an opaque travel agency.
This paper is also related to previous studies on facilitating practices. The role of the most-
favored-customer (MFC) clause as a practice facilitating coordination in a price-setting duopoly has
been studied extensively in the theoretical industrial organization literature (for example, Cooper
(1986) and Holt and Sche®man (1987)), and the theory is con¯rmed by Scott Morton (1997a,
1997b), where she ¯nds that the MFC clause adopted by Medicaid for reimbursement leads to an
increase in drug prices. Another important facilitating device identi¯ed in the literature is trade
10Cannibalization is a legitimate concern for many service provides. Northwest Airline discontinued its relationship
with Pricline on June 2002 for being increasingly concerned with Priceline's business model. Hotel industry expressed
similar concern on the long-term risk of Priceline in cannibalization of sales from primary selling channels (see Wang,
Gal-Or and Chatterjee (2006)).
7restrictions. Krishna (1989) shows that quantitative restrictions, such as voluntary export restric-
tion (VER), can impede competition, facilitate collusion and raise prices in a price-setting duopoly.
Similarly, the introduction of opaque travel agency in our model can be regarded as a facilitating
device that service providers can use to raise prices to business travellers in equilibrium.11
Another paper that is related to ours is Granados, Gupta and Kau®man (2005). They examine
the use of transparency strategy for Internet-based selling as a means for the ¯rm to maximize
the value of its selling activities. They descriptively argue how di®erent online travel agencies
adopt di®erent level of transparency in product characteristics, price and supplier identity, and
how consumers' willingness to pay varies with respect to di®erent levels of transparency. Our
model formalizes some of their ideas.
Generally, the novel practice of Hotwire.com and Priceline.com, has attracted much interest from
economists and marketing researchers, and many of them study the \Name Your Own Price" feature
of Priceline and its implication to seller's revenue and buyer's willingness to pay (for example, Hann
and Terwiesch (2003), Fay (2004), Spann, Skiera and Schafers (2004) and Terwiesch, Savin, and
Hann (2005)). In contrast, we focus only on the opaque feature of Priceline and Hotwire and assume
that opaque OTAs o®er products at posted prices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 3 we formally describe a benchmark
model without opaque travel agencies and solve for equilibria. In section 4 we introduce an opaque
agency and characterize all symmetric equilibria that arise in the new setting. We then compare
the equilibrium pro¯t among di®erent equilibria and ¯nd which one is the most pro¯table. Section
5 concludes the paper. All the proofs are given in the Appendix.
3 Model without Opaque Agency
In this section we present a benchmark model that describes hotels' competition without opaque
travel agencies. In the next section, we will introduce an opaque agency and compare the new
equilibria with the benchmark.
Consider a circle-shaped city with N hotels (Salop (1979)). The distance between any two
adjacent hotels is s and the length of the city is Ns. In what follows we assume that s is ¯xed and
does not depend on N. Consequently, as compared to standard models of horizontal di®erentiation,
11One can also interpret the opaque service as a screening tool for the service providers to separate business travelers
from leisure travelers. Thus our model is also related to the large screening literature. See Armstrong (2006) and
Stole (2007) for recent surveys.
8N is not a measure of competition but rather a measure of the market size. We assume that hotels
have unlimited room capacity, and the cost of providing one room is equal to c, which we normalize
to 0. Hotels compete with each other for travelers.
Travelers are described by their preferred location x within the city and travel cost t. There are
two groups of travelers: high-type (business) travelers with travel cost tH and low-type (leisure)
travelers with travel cost tL. We assume that tH ¸ tL. The type of each customer, thus, is a
two-dimensional variable (x;i), where x 2 [0;Ns) and i 2 fL;Hg. Denote the set of all types as T.
If a customer of type (x;i) 2 T stays at hotel h and pays price p, his utility is
u(x;i) = v ¡ ti ¢ d(h;x) ¡ p;
where d(h;x) is the distance between hotel h and x; ti is the cost of traveling distance 1, and v
is the value of staying in a hotel. In what follows we will assume that the value of staying in the
hotel v is large enough so that all travelers will stay in some hotel.12
Location preferences of both high-type and low-type consumers are uniformly distributed along
the circle. We assume that the total mass of consumers between two adjacent hotels is one. The
fraction of business travelers among them is ° and the fraction of leisure travelers is 1 ¡ °.
Notice that while we refer to ti;i 2 fL;Hg; as travel cost, it can be interpreted more generally
as the strength of preferences for a particular good characteristic. It could be the strength of
consumers' preference for morning versus evening °ights, or for one brand over another.
In what follows we shall restrict our attention to the symmetric equilibrium. In this equilibrium
all hotels charge the same price pn where index n stands for \no opaque agency". Proposition 1
describes this equilibrium and also speci¯es conditions under which this equilibrium exists.
Proposition 1 (i) In a symmetric equilibrium, if it exists, all hotels charge the price equal to
pn =
s
°tL + (1 ¡ °)tH
tLtH; (1)
and customers are served by the nearest hotel. The equilibrium pro¯t ¼n = pn.










The idea of the proof is quite straightforward. In the ¯rst part we use the standard Hotelling
argument to show that the equilibrium price must be pn if a symmetric equilibrium exists. It
12Given this assumption it is not essential whether vL = vH or not.
9is clear from equation (1) that the higher is the share of leisure travelers, 1 ¡ °, the lower is
the equilibrium price. Naturally, the presence of customers who are less sensitive to product
di®erentiation intensi¯es the competition and drives down the equilibrium price and ¯rms' pro¯ts.
In the second part we provide conditions under which the symmetric equilibrium exists. To see
why it can fail to exist consider the case with tH > tL = 0. It follows from part (i) of Proposition 1
that the equilibrium price and pro¯ts should be zero. Charging a small positive price then becomes
a pro¯table deviation since a deviating hotel would serve a positive share of high-type customers.13
In fact, whenever tH=tL is so high that (2) is violated it is always pro¯table for a particular hotel
to increase its price and serve only high-type customers.
To get further understanding of (2) note that for ° close to 0 or 1 the upper bound becomes
in¯nitely large. Intuitively, when ° is close to 0, the number of business travelers is too small for
hotels to pro¯t from serving only high-type customers. Thus, unless tH is extremely large, hotels
will not deviate from the symmetric equilibrium. When ° is close to 1 then pn becomes so high
that, unless tH is su±ciently large, serving only high-type customers does not produce a higher
pro¯t. Putting it di®erently, when ° is close to 1 leisure travelers are less of impediment and the
deviation becomes unpro¯table.
4 Model with Opaque Agency
In this section we will introduce an online travel agency with the opaque feature into the model. We
will refer to travel agencies without the opaque feature as either transparent or standard agencies.
The travel agency with the opaque feature will be referred to as opaque or discount agency. Rooms
reserved through the opaque (non-opaque) agency will be often called opaque (non-opaque) rooms.
Travelers can either use a standard reservation system or the opaque agency. In the former case
travelers can choose a hotel where they prefer to stay. In the latter case, hotels' identity is revealed
only after the transaction is completed and it could be any one of participating hotels. Thus the set
of travelers' choices is Ct = fopaque-agency, 1;:::;Ng. In what follows we will focus on equilibria
13The fact the symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies fails to exist for large travel cost ratios is not unique to
our model and holds in other similar models. In Ellison (2005), for example, there are two types of customers with
di®erent marginal utilities of income, so that a person paying price p for a good receives dis-utility of ®ip where
i 2 fl;hg and ®l > ®h. In Ellison's model the symmetric equilibrium exists only for a particular range of ®l=®h
that is bounded from the above by 10.66 (Ellison (2005), p. 632). If the ®-ratio is higher than 10.66 there exists a
pro¯table deviation where a ¯rm raises its price and serves only high-type customers.
10where all hotels participate. Consequently, a higher N implies that customers have less precise
information about the location of the opaque room. This suggests an alternative interpretation of
N as a measure of the opacity level for rooms sold through the opaque agency. A higher N implies
that more information is concealed and so the opacity level is higher.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, travelers observe their types. Then hotels publicly
announce list prices fphg
N
h=1 and decide whether they are willing to participate in the opaque
sales or not. Those hotels that decide to participate privately submit discounted prices fqhg
N
h=1
to the opaque agency. The opaque agency posts discounted prices but conceals hotel identities.
Travelers learn which hotels participate in opaque sales14 and observe fph;qhg. Afterwards they
decide whether to reserve an opaque or non-opaque room and for the latter case they also choose
the hotel to stay.
As the timing of the game suggests, a hotel's strategy is a pair (ph;dh), where ph is a publicly
available rate and dh is either a discounted price qh or a non-participating decision. A traveler's
strategy is a mapping ¾(x;i) that for each price vector fph;dhgH
h=1 determines a reservation choice in
Ct. The mapping is indexed by traveler's type (x;i). Finally, the opaque agency in our model is not
strategic and its role is reduced to posting hotel prices while concealing hotel identities. In partic-
ular, we do not model the competition between opaque agencies and how they set prices. However,
one can think of the opaque price in our model as an equilibrium outcome of the competition be-
tween opaque agencies. We believe that our results will be qualitatively robust to the introduction
of competition between opaque agencies, because our analysis remains valid for a strictly positive
opaque price. Another reason we refrain from modelling competition between agencies is that
Priceline and Hotwire adopt very di®erent pricing strategies and their details are not well known.
Therefore, it is complicated and subtle to precisely model the competition between the two opaque
sites. We think the way we model opaque agencies, though stylized, captures their essential role in
market segmentation.
14That is, we assume that hotel's partipation decision is publicly observable to travellers. Therefore, if a partic-
ular hotel withdraws from the opaque agency, it will a®ect travelers' perception of the opaque level of the opaque
service. For example, if hotel h does not participate in the opaque agency, then for travelers located at point h the
opaque agency becomes less attractive. Alternatively, we can assume that hotel's participation is private so that the
withdrawal of one hotel has no e®ect on consumers' perceived opacity level. For instance, in case of °ight tickets the
main source of opacity is concealed itinerary information and is largely una®ected by a withdrawal of one airline.
Under this alternative assumption, the results are qualitatively the same. However, the set of parameters for which
di®erent types of equilibria exist is larger.





is an equilibrium in the model with
an opaque travel agency if:
(a) Given behavior of other hotels, (p¡h;d¡h); and customers' strategies f¾(x;i)g(x;i)2T, hotel h
chooses list price ph and dh to maximize its pro¯t;
(b) Given hotel prices fph;qhgN
h=1 a traveler of type (x;i) chooses a strategy ¾(x;i) to maximize
his utility. Speci¯cally, for each price vector a traveler has to decide whether to get a room in a
particular hotel or whether to reserve a room through the opaque agency.
In the paper we will restrict our attention only to symmetric equilibria in which all hotels
participate in opaque sales. In these equilibria p1 = ¢¢¢ = pN and q1 = ¢¢¢ = qN.
From the buyers' point of view, rooms o®ered by di®erent hotels through the opaque agency
are perfect substitutes. Thus when selling rooms via the opaque agency, hotels lose the advantage
of product di®erentiation and the competition drives the discounted price down to the marginal
cost. To see this, notice that if a customer of type (x;i) prefers the opaque room his total cost will
be qh + ti ¢ E[d];where E[d] is the expected distance that the customer will have to travel. Since
E[d] is the same for all hotels, the customer will always choose the one with the cheapest price.
It follows from the logic of Bertrand competition that the discounted price must be equal to the
marginal cost.
The fact that hotels compete for customers not only through standard reservation systems but
also through the discount agency is somewhat extreme since it leads to zero pro¯ts from the opaque
sales. Nonetheless, as Proposition 6 shows, having the discount agency can increase overall pro¯t
even when the pro¯t from opaque sales is zero. Thus, if we change the way hotels compete at the
opaque level so that they do earn positive pro¯ts from opaque transactions, then the introduction
of the opaque agency would become even more pro¯table.
We will assume that when hotels charge the same discounted price they equally split all cus-
tomers. From the customer's point of view, this means that the probability of staying at a particular
hotel is the same and is equal to 1=N. Assume that N is even and take a customer located at dis-























Not surprisingly, larger N leads to a larger expected cost. In other words, a higher opacity
degree of rooms leads to a higher disutility from using the opaque agency. Another important
12observation is that for even N the expected travel cost does not depend on x. This fact will
dramatically simplify our analysis and in what follows we will keep the assumption of even N.
4.1 Classi¯cation of Equilibria
In the model with an opaque agency, customers are divided between opaque and non-opaque market
segments. Technically, there are many ways they can be split between the two. However, as we
show below most of them are not possible in equilibrium.
² All customers reserve opaque rooms. This is not an equilibrium. Indeed, in this case all hotels
earn zero pro¯t. Hotel h could pro¯tably deviate by charging a small positive list price which
would attract high-type customers located at or close to h.
² Nobody reserves opaque rooms. For some parameter values this could be an equilibrium.
Obviously, this equilibrium would coincide with the one found in Section 3 and, in particular,
hotels earn the same pro¯t in both equilibria. Given this and the fact that Priceline and
Hotwire complete millions of transactions annually we will not consider this case in the paper.
² Some high-type travelers reserve opaque rooms. The next proposition shows that this is
impossible as long as N is not too small.
Proposition 2 If N ¸ 4 then in any symmetric equilibrium all customers of the high type
prefer to use the non-opaque agency.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. When N is large the uncertainty for high-
type customers about the opaque product becomes high. Consequently, hotels ¯nd it easier
and more pro¯table to attract business customers to the standard reservation system.
Since we are only interested in the equilibria where some travelers are served by the opaque
agency there are two possibilities left.
² Full separation. All high-type customers reserve through standard travel agencies, and all
low-type customers use the opaque service.
² Partial separation. All high-type customers and some (but not all) low-type customers reserve
through standard travel agencies. The remaining low-type customers use the opaque service.
13Below we will solve for equilibria with full and partial separations. We analyze the former in
Section 4.2 and the latter is studied in Section 4.3. It was already established that the equilibrium
discounted price is equal to the marginal cost which is zero. Thus what is left to do is to ¯nd the
list price and verify that it determines an equilibrium.
4.2 Equilibrium with Full Separation
De¯nition 2 The list price pf is an equilibrium price in an equilibrium with full separation if the
following conditions are satis¯ed:













NstL · pf: (ICL)
(c) For each hotel h, list price pf maximizes its pro¯t when all other hotels charge pf;
(d) Each hotel ¯nds it pro¯table to participate in opaque sales.
It follows from (a) that all business travelers will use standard agencies, from (b) it follows that
all leisure travelers will use the opaque agency. Conditions (c) and (d) guarantee that hotels do
not have incentive to deviate from the equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (i) If there exists an equilibrium with full separation then the equilibrium list price
is pf = stH;
(ii) The full separation equilibrium with pf = stH exists if and only if the following conditions

















Part (i) explicitly assumes that only high-type customers use the non-opaque agency, in which
case an immediate extension of the standard Hotelling logic shows that pf = stH. In order for
pf to be an equilibrium price, pf should satisfy requirements (a)-(d) in De¯nition 2 which leads
to conditions speci¯ed in part (ii). Intuitively, if we treat N as the measure of the opacity degree
part (ii) states that the equilibrium with full separation exists only for moderate opacity levels.
14If opacity is too low, i.e. N < 6, business travelers will switch to the opaque agency since the
uncertainty about hotel locations is not as large as the di®erence between the list and discounted
price. If the opacity level is so high such that condition (3) is violated, then both leisure travelers
and hotels will deviate from the full separation. Leisure travelers will ¯nd the location uncertainty
to be too big and switch to the non-opaque service. Hotels will ¯nd it pro¯table to cut the price
and serve some low-type customers directly through non-opaque channels.
Other requirements that condition (3) imposes on parameters is that, tH=tL and ° should be
su±ciently high. The former means that business travelers should be su±ciently di®erent from
leisure travelers and the latter means that there should be su±ciently many of them.
Interestingly, at least to some extent, it is the intense Bertrand competition on the opaque level
that enables hotels to charge higher prices through their standard reservation systems. Very low
opaque prices make it unpro¯table for hotels to deviate and attract low-type customers. The high
non-opaque price can then be sustained in the equilibrium. To see this, assume that the discount
price is q and consider a leisure traveler whose location preference coincides with the location of
hotel h. The total cost of reserving an opaque room is q+N=4stL. The total cost of reserving a non-
opaque room at hotel h is ph (the list price of hotel h plus zero travel cost). When ph < q+N=4stL
this traveler and other leisure travelers close to him will prefer to reserve rooms in hotel h. Thus,
the higher the opaque price is, the easier it becomes for hotels to attract low-type customers to
their non-opaque channels.
Clearly, it would be incorrect to claim that the Bertrand competition on the opaque level
is necessary to prevent hotels from deviation. In particular, depending on parameters the full
separation equilibrium will still exist if the opaque agency charges a small fee for each transaction.
The main message is rather that in order for hotels to charge a high list price in equilibrium,
leisure travelers should be charged low prices. Bertrand competition is just an extreme yet easy-
to-implement way of doing that.
4.3 Equilibrium with Partial Separation
In this section we will describe equilibria when some (but not all) leisure travelers reserve opaque
rooms.
De¯nition 3 The list price pps is an equilibrium price in a symmetric equilibrium with partial
separation if the following conditions are satis¯ed:










(b) Leisure travelers located at distance d0 2 (0;s=2) from the nearest hotel are indi®erent
between reserving opaque and non-opaque rooms.
1
4
NstL = pps + d0tL: (IC0
L)
(c) For each hotel h, list price pps maximizes its pro¯t when all other hotels charge pps.
(d) Each hotel ¯nds it pro¯table to participate in opaque sales.
Figure 1: Traveler x is a high-type traveler indi®erent between staying at h and h ¡ 1. Traveler y is a high-type
indi®erent between h and h + 1. Travelers x
0 and y
0 are leisure travelers indi®erent between a room at h and an
opaque room. The distance from travelers x
0 and y
0 to hotel h is d
0.
Figure 1 shows choices that will be made by customers in an equilibrium with partial separation.
Hotel h serves all low-type customers whose distance to hotel h is less than d0 and only them. From
(ICL






The set of business travelers served by hotel h is determined by locations of two customers: x who
is indi®erent between h and h¡ 1 and y who is indi®erent between h and h+1. From indi®erence







































°tL + 4(1 ¡ °)tH
stLtH: (6)
16For pps to be an equilibrium it has to satisfy (IC0
H) and (IC0
L). In particular, it should be the
case that d0 as determined by (4) should belong to (0;s=2). If d0 · 0, (d0 ¸ s=2) then all leisure
consumers would use the opaque (non-opaque) agency.
Proposition 4 If N ¸ 6; then pps satis¯es (IC0
H).
Intuitively, when the number of hotels is su±ciently large (as large as 6), the expected travel
cost for the business travelers will be high, which would make opaque reservations less attractive
for them.































The intuition behind Proposition 5 is as follows. When ° is small (less than (N ¡ 4)=(N ¡ 2))
then hotels will always ¯nd it optimal to attract all leisure travelers to non-opaque agencies. When
° is moderately high then, as long as there is a substantial di®erence in travel costs, the partial
equilibrium will exist. However, when ° is very high (larger than N=(N + 2)) the di®erence in
travel costs cannot be too large. Otherwise hotels will not be interested in serving the low-type at
all (at least not through standard reservation systems).
Propositions 4 and 5 characterize necessary conditions for pps to be a partial separation equi-
librium. If given pps all hotels prefer to participate in the opaque sales, then pps will indeed be
an equilibrium. In the next section we will show that whenever these necessary conditions are
satis¯ed the partial separation equilibrium is always less pro¯table than the equilibrium without
opaque agency. Therefore, we do not derive a full set of conditions for the existence of the partial
separation equilibrium.
4.4 Pro¯t Comparison
In previous sections we have solved for equilibria with full and partial separation and described the
necessary conditions under which they exist. In this section we are interested in how hotel pro¯ts
in these equilibria compare to pro¯ts in the equilibrium without the opaque agency.
It is worth mentioning that in all three equilibria, the size of the market is the same. Given our
assumptions, the total demand for travel services is perfectly inelastic and is always equal to a total
17mass of travelers, N. However, in di®erent equilibria di®erent groups of customers pay di®erent
prices. In the equilibrium without the opaque agency all customers pay the same price pn (see (1)).
In the equilibrium with full separation, leisure travelers pay price equal to the marginal cost 0, and
business travelers pay higher price, pf = stH. Finally, in the equilibrium with partial separation,
some leisure travelers pay price zero, whereas all other customers pay higher price pps (see (6)).
The next proposition contains the main result of this paper as it compares the pro¯ts across
di®erent types of equilibria. In particular, it characterizes conditions under which the equilibrium
with full separation is more pro¯table than the equilibrium without an opaque agency.
Proposition 6 (i) Assume that parameters are such that both the equilibrium without an opaque








(ii) For any N ¸ 6 the set of parameters for which both equilibria exist AND the equilibrium
with full separation is more pro¯table is not-empty.
(iii) The equilibrium with partial separation, if exists, is less pro¯table than the equilibrium
without an opaque agency.
The ¯rst part of the proposition determines the condition when the equilibrium with full sep-
aration is more pro¯table than the equilibrium without the opaque agency. The condition itself
immediately follows from a comparison of the pro¯ts in two equilibria and is very intuitive. The
full separation pro¯t ¼f = °stH is determined by the amount of customers served, °, and the price
they pay stH. Consequently, for ¼f to be higher it should be the case that ° and tH (as compared
to tL) are su±ciently high. Another interpretation of (7) is that for each particular level of ° the
travel cost ratio should be high enough. The lower (higher) is °, the higher (lower) should be the
di®erence in travel costs in order for the full separation to be more pro¯table.
The second part of the Proposition veri¯es that the conditions for the existence of both equilibria
and the conditions under which the full separation equilibrium is more pro¯table are not mutually
exclusive. There are four conditions involved: condition (2) from Proposition 1 guarantees that
the equilibrium with full separation exists. Conditions N ¸ 6 and (3) of Proposition 3 guarantee
that the equilibrium with full separation exists and ¯nally condition (7) of the current proposition
guarantees that the full separation is more pro¯table. Figure 2 helps visualize these conditions for
18N = 6 and N = 8. Both equilibria exist and the full separation is more pro¯table in the area below
the dash-dotted line and above the upper envelope of the solid and the dotted lines.














Existence and Profitability of Different Types of Equilibria (N=6)
Figure 2: The dash-dotted line on the top represents condition (2). For travel-cost ratios below this line the
symmetric equilibrium exists. The solid line on the bottom represents condition (3). For travel cost ratios above the
solid line the symmetric equilibrium exists. The dotted line on the bottom represents condition (7). For travel cost
ratios above this line the equilibrium with full separation is more pro¯table. Finally, two dashed lines that are almost
vertical bound the area where the equilibrium with partial separation exists.
The last part of Proposition 6 shows that the equilibrium with partial separation, if it exists,
is always less pro¯table than the equilibrium without the opaque agency.
The most important result in Proposition 6 is part (i) that determines when introducing an
opaque agency leads to a new equilibrium with higher pro¯t. The source of the pro¯t increase does
not come from new customers who are attracted to the market by cheap prices. As we mentioned
earlier, in our model the size of the market does not respond to prices. The source of the extra
pro¯t comes from hotels' ability to separate di®erent types of customers and to make the high-type
pay higher prices. Importantly, it is the opaque agency that enables hotels to do that. Without
the opaque agency hotels would compete for the low-type thereby driving the equilibrium price
down. With the opaque agency, the low-type pays an extremely low price and it is not pro¯table
for hotels to compete for them via non-opaque channels. This enables hotels to sustain a higher
list price paid by business travelers and to increase the overall pro¯t.
Clearly, hotels will be interested in the opaque agency only if the pro¯t in the new equilibrium
is higher than in the equilibrium without the opaque agency. This will occur when the equilibrium
19with full separation exists and is more pro¯table. In particular, there should be su±ciently many
business customers on the market and travel costs of business and leisure customers should be
su±ciently di®erent. A possible caveat is that if parameters are such that the equilibria with
both full and partial separation exist then there is a multiplicity of equilibria with the former
being more pro¯table than the benchmark, and the latter being less pro¯table. However, if hotels
can coordinate on a particular equilibrium then they will coordinate on the equilibrium with full
separation as this is the most pro¯table one. On Figure 2 the set of parameters for which all three
equilibria might co-exist is bounded by the solid line on the bottom, the dash-dotted line on the
top and two dashed lines on the sides.
Finally, from our analysis we can elucidate the role of the degree of opacity. Except for the
pro¯t-inferior equilibrium with partial separation N has no e®ect on the equilibrium prices and
pro¯ts. N does a®ect, however, the set of parameters for which the equilibria with partial and,
most importantly, full separation exist. As established in Proposition 3, for the equilibrium with
full separation to exist, the degree of opacity cannot be too low or too high. A low degree of opacity
would encourage business travelers to switch to the opaque agency, in which case, the opaque OTA
would cannibalize on standard distribution channels and lead to a decline in pro¯t. A high degree
of opacity would make it unpro¯table for leisure customers to use the opaque agency. In this case,
the equilibrium with full separation will not exist, and the introduction of the opaque agency will
fail to increase hotels' pro¯ts.
5 Conclusion
The main goal of our paper is to provide a rationale of why ¯rms that produce di®erentiated goods
decide to deliver goods through opaque services such as Priceline or Hotwire, and to investigate
how these services a®ect competition. Due to the opaque feature of Priceline and Hotwire, rooms
from di®erent hotels and °ights of di®erent airlines are indistinguishable, so the competition is
head to head. It may seem counterintuitive for ¯rms to join opaque services since it intensi¯es
competition. In the literature potential explanations to this puzzle include a possibility that hotels
can use Priceline and Hotwire to adjust for seasonal changes in demand or to attract new customers
with very high price sensitivity.
In this paper, we take a di®erent approach. We assume that the market size is ¯xed so that
¯rms cannot attract more customers by lowering prices. Nonetheless, as we show, ¯rms may
20still prefer an equilibrium with the opaque agency over the equilibrium without it. This occurs
because the opaque agency increases competition for low-type customers who are less sensitive to
particular characteristics of the good (e.g. a hotel location). On the other hand, the existstence
of an opaque opaque agency decreases competition for the more lucrative segment of the market
| high-type customers who are sensitive to di®erences in concealed characteristics. As we show,
under some natural conditions, increased pro¯ts from high-type customers outweigh losses from
low-type customers and so the total pro¯ts increase.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) In the symmetric equilibrium, if it exists, hotel h serves both types
of customers and directly competes only with the adjacent hotels h ¡ 1 and h + 1.
Denote the price charged by hotel h as ph. Business and leisure customers indi®erent between














Similarly, business and leisure customers indi®erent between hotels h and h ¡ 1 are located at yH















































°tL + (1 ¡ °)tH
; h = 1;:::;N (8)
It can be immediately veri¯ed that prices
p1 = ¢¢¢ = pN =
s
°tL + (1 ¡ °)tH
tLtH
satisfy the ¯rst-order conditions and are the only candidates for the symmetric equilibrium prices.
(ii) The rest of the proof is devoted to ¯nding conditions under which pn constitutes an equi-
librium. Recall that in part (i) we explicitly assumed that hotel h serves both types of customers
21and competes only with the adjacent hotels. Thus there are two possible deviations that have not
been accounted for in part (i). First, if hotel h decreases its price so much that it competes with
hotels that are not adjacent. For this to happen ph should be less than pn ¡stL. Second, if hotel h
raises the price so much that it serves only business customers. This will occur when ph > pn+stL.
We start with the ¯rst deviation and show that it is never pro¯table. Assume that all other
hotels charge prices pn and hotel h charges ph < pn¡stL. Business customer located at point h¡1
prefers hotel h ¡ 1 to h if and only if pn · ph + stH. If ph = 0 the inequality above becomes
s
°tL + (1 ¡ °)tH
tLtH · sth;
which is always satis¯ed. Thus even if hotel h decreases its price to zero it will compete for business
customers only with the adjacent hotels.
















2tL + (k + 1)s
´







ph + (1 ¡ °)Nph if pn ¡ (N=2)stL ¸ ph
The ¯rst line shows h's pro¯t when it competes with a hotel at distance (k + 1)s from h's
location. This is for each k between 1 and (N=2) ¡ 1. The second line is h's pro¯t when it serves
all leisure customers. We will show that the pro¯t function is strictly increasing on the range
ph · pn ¡ stL which will imply that ph < pn ¡ stL cannot be a pro¯table deviation.
To see that the pro¯t function is increasing notice that it consists of N=2 concave parabolas.
Parabolas described by the ¯rst line achieve their maximum at
^ ph =
pn + pn (° + (k + 1)(1 ¡ °))
2
> pn:
The parabola described by the second line achieves its maximum at
¹ ph =
°pn + (° + (1 ¡ °)N)stH
2°
> pn
Thus each parabola is an increasing function on the range where it determines the pro¯t and so ¼h
is an increasing function when ph < pn ¡ stL. This proves that it is never pro¯table for a hotel to
decrease the price and try to compete with hotels that are not adjacent.
The second possible deviation for hotel h is to dramatically increase ph so that it serves only









22The pro¯t function is strictly concave in ph and is maximized at p0
h = (pn + stH)=2 > pn. Thus
hotel h will have a pro¯table deviation if and only if p0
h > pn +stL and ¼h(p0
h) > ¼h(pn). The ¯rst
condition says that a leisure customer located at point h prefers to be served by hotel h¡1 and thus
hotel h serves only business travelers when charging p0
h. The second condition states that charging
p0
h is pro¯table. If either one of two conditions fails, pn constitutes a symmetric equilibrium and
hotels do not have pro¯table deviations.
Condition p0
















4stH(pn + stH)2 > pn = ¼h(pn) is equivalent to
(1 ¡ °)tH=tL + ° >
°=2
























so that we can re-write conditions (9) and (10) as tH=tL > l1 and tH=tL > l2; respectively. With
long and tedious algebra that we omit one can show that l1 < l2 for any 0 < ° < 1:
Now it is easy to see that hotel h does not deviate if and only if tH=tL · l2 which is equivalent
to (2). Indeed, if tH=tL · l2 then ¼(p0
h;pn;pn) · ¼(pn;pn;pn) and so the deviation is unpro¯table.
This proves the \if" part. If tH=tL > l2 then tH=tL > l1 as well and so the deviation is pro¯table
and p0
h > pn + stL, that is h serves only business customers when it charges p0
h. This proves the
\only if" part. Therefore, pn is a symmetric equilibrium if and only if (2) holds.¥
Proof of Proposition 2. To prove the result, we proceed by contradiction. Assume that when
N ¸ 4 some high-type customers will choose opaque rooms in equilibrium.
Denote the list equilibrium price as pH, and recall that the discounted price is equal to the
marginal cost which is zero. The location of the business traveler who is indi®erent between using
opaque and non-opaque agencies is determined by the indi®erence condition:
tHxH + pH =
1
4















23Since some business travelers use the opaque service it has to be the case that 0 < xH < s=2.
In what follows we will show that xH > s=2 when N ¸ 4 which will be a contradiction to our initial
assumption.






sxHpH if xL(pH) · 0 (i: e: pH > NstL=4)
2°
sxHpH + 21 ¡ °
s xLpH if xL(pH) > 0 (i: e: pH · NstL=4)
:
The ¯rst line represents the case when all leisure travelers use the opaque agency, the second when
some (but not all) of them use the opaque agency. Since xL < xH < s=2 these are the only two
cases.
If there is an equilibrium with xH < s=2 then the equilibrium price should maximize ¼(pH)
within the range such that 0 · xH(pH) < s=2. There are three possible cases.
Case 1: xL(pH) < 0: all low-type customers prefer opaque product. Then the equilibrium















Clearly, xH(pH) < s=2 only when N < 4.






























°tL + (1 ¡ °)tH
: (11)












which is equivalent to
2tH(1 ¡ °)(N ¡ 2) < tL(N ¡ 2°(N ¡ 2)):
24When N ¸ 4; tH is multiplied by a term that is greater than the term that multiplies tL and since
tH > tL (12) can hold only when N < 4.
Case 3: xL(pH) = 0. This case needs to be considered separately because it is possible that
the pro¯t function does not reach its maximum on intervals pH > NstL=4 and pH < NstL=4 in
which case the FOC logic of Cases 1 and 2 is not applicable.
We will show that this case is impossible. Let p0 be such price that xL(p0) = 0: The pro¯t
function consists of two parabolas, and so in order for p0 to bring the maximum it has to be the
case that none of the two parabolas reach their maxima on the interval where they determine the
pro¯t. However, this is impossible. When ¼(pH) = 2°sxHpH; its maximum is reached at point
pH = NstH=8, which is greater than NstL=4 when tH > 2tL: If tH · 2tL then the second branch of






°tL + (1 ¡ °)tH
:
To show that it is less than NstL=4 is equivalent to showing that tH=2 < °tL + (1 ¡ °)tH; which
is true because tH=2 · tL < °tL + (1 ¡ °)tH:¥
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Assume that hotels h¡1 and h+1 charge prices ph¡1 and ph+1
























Apply symmetry, we get
pf = stH:
(ii) For pf = stH to be an equilibrium we need to check the incentive compatibility constraints












25which holds if and only if tH=tL ¸ N=4. Later we will show that (ICL) will follow from the
non-deviation conditions for the hotels.
The rest of the proof will determine the conditions under which hotels do not deviate. There
are two possible deviations that should be considered. The ¯rst one is to participate in opaque
sales but charge ph 6= stH. The second one is to quit the opaque agency.














Proof of Claim 1. We established in part (i) that pf is optimal for hotel h if it serves only
high-type customers. Thus the only potentially pro¯table price deviation for hotel h is to decrease
its list price so much that it would attract some leisure customers.
Hotel h will attract leisure travelers if ph < NstL=4: Given that the two adjacent hotels charge























ph if ph ¸ 1
4NstL
This pro¯t function is continuous and consists of two quadratic components (see Figure 3). The
¯rst component represents hotel h's pro¯t when some low-type customers reserve rooms at hotel
h; and the second one represents its payo® when it attracts no low-type customers.
1/4Nst_L st_H pd














: Pro¯t function of hotel h.
As shown in part (i), the unrestricted maximum of the second parabola is reached at point
pf = stH and from (ICL) we know that pf is greater than 1
4NstL. Thus the pro¯t function can
achieve the global maximum at a price di®erent from pf if and only if the ¯rst parabola reaches its
maximum on the interval [0;1=4NstL] and its value at this maximum is greater than ¼h(pf).
If we ignore for a moment the constraint p 2 [0;1=4NstL], the maximum of the ¯rst parabola
is reached at
pd =
°stLtH + (1 ¡ °)1
4NstLtH
tL° + 2(1 ¡ °)tH
:
26When pd > 1
4NstL; the pro¯t maximum is reached at point pf, since the ¯rst parabola will be
monotone on the range where it is de¯ned. Thus the only local maximum pf will be also a global
one. It is easy to see that condition pd > 1














When (14) is not satis¯ed there are two local maxima. To ¯nd the global maximum we need
to compare ¼h(pd) and ¼h(pf)
¼h(pd) · ¼h(pf) ,
1
s
(°stL + (1 ¡ °) 1
4NstL)2


















A deviation where hotel h changes the price without quitting the opaque agency is pro¯table if





¸ 1 then (14) fails for sure, so hotel


































and therefore, if condition (15) is violated so is condition (14). Again, whether hotel h will deviate
or not is completely determined by (15). To summarize, if (15) holds then hotel will not deviate
since the deviation pro¯t is less than the equilibrium pro¯t. If (15) does not hold then (14) does
not hold either and h has a pro¯table deviation. This completes the proof of Claim 1.

















Proof of Claim 2. Assume that hotel h wants to unilaterally quit the opaque agency. We
calculate its pro¯t from deviation, assuming that all other hotels do not change their behavior,
whereas customers will respond optimally to new prices and the new opaque structure (this is
similar to how, for example, Bertrand competition is analyzed).
27In particular, all customers know that hotel h will no longer provide opaque rooms, which
changes their expected travel cost associated with the opaque agency. For the customer located at

















As we move away from point h, say to the left, the distance to N=2 hotels on the left decreases
while the distance to the remaining (N ¡ 2)=2 hotels increases by the same amount. Thus the




















The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Claim 1. Given the result of part (i), hotel h
will not set a price such that only high-type customers are served. Thus, if the pro¯table deviation
exists, hotel h will serve customers of both types and will charge ph < pf.
The high-type consumer indi®erent between hotels h and h ¡ 1 locates at a distance of (stH ¡
p)=(2tH)+s=2 from hotel h. Thus a total number of high-type agents who prefer hotel h to either









In particular, notice that the largest group of high-type travelers that h can potentially attract (if
it charges price 0) is exactly the consumers located between hotels h ¡ 1 and h + 1.
We observe that all high-type customers that prefer h to adjacent hotels also prefer h to the
opaque agency and thus (16) determines the number of high-type customers served by hotel h.
Indeed, when N ¸ 6 and ph = pf business travelers located at points h ¡ 1 and h + 1 will prefer
hotel h to the opaque agency without hotel h. Thus, all customers between h ¡ 1 and h + 1 will
prefer hotel h to the opaque agency without hotel h. This holds for any ph < pf which is exactly
the price range where pro¯table deviation is possible. Thus all high-type customers that prefer h
to h ¡ 1 and h + 1 also prefer it to the opaque agency.






















































The maximum of the pro¯t function is reached at point
pdev =
° + (1 ¡ °)N
4




and the pro¯t value at that point is equal to
¼dev =
(° + (1 ¡ °)N
4 )2
°tL + 2(1 ¡ °)N¡1
N tH
stLtH:
Similar to the logic used in proving Claim 1 we notice that the deviation is pro¯table if and only
if ¼dev > °stH = ¼f and pdev <
N2
4(N ¡ 1)
stL. The last condition guarantees that when ph = pdev
leisure customers are served directly by hotel h. The expression on the right is the expected travel
cost of a leisure customer located at point h if he uses the opaque agency.



















































Notice that the only di®erence between (15) and (14) from Claim 1 and between (17) and (18)
is that the RHS in the last two conditions is multiplied by N=(N ¡1). Consequently, we can apply
the reasoning of Claim 1 to show that hotel h will not deviate if and only if (17) holds. This
completes the proof of Claim 2.
Clearly, the condition in Claim 2 is more strict than the one in Claim 1. Furthermore, (ICL)
follows from the condition provided by Claim 2. Combining our preceding arguments and the
29results of the two claims, we conclude that pf constitutes the equilibrium with full separation if

















which completes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4. A slack (IC0
H) is equivalent to pps < 1
4 (N ¡ 2)stH. Using the
expression (6) of pps; we can rewrite it as
° + 1
2(1 ¡ °)N










2(1 ¡ °)N ¡ 1
4 (N ¡ 2)°
(N ¡ 2)(1 ¡ °)
:
With some elementary calculations, we can show that the right hand side is less than 1 when
N ¸ 6: Since tH=tL is higher than 1; the above inequality is always valid. Therefore, (IC0
H) is not
binding.¥











°tL + 4(1 ¡ °)tH
stH:







°tL + 4(1 ¡ °)tH
stH < s=2:
With some algebra, we can show:
d0 < s=2 , (N ¡ 2)°tL < 2(°(N ¡ 2) ¡ (N ¡ 4))tH
Notice that when ° · N¡4
N¡2; the RHS is less than zero and so the inequality cannot be satis¯ed.
When ° > N¡4









As for the condition d0 > 0 we can show











When ° · N
N+2 then the LHS is non-positive and so this inequality is automatically satis¯ed. If °
is greater than N







































This complete the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 6. (i) Denote ahotel's pro¯t in the equilibrium with full separation as
¼f and the equilibrium without the opaque agency as ¼n. We need to show that
¼f = °stH >
stHtL
°tL + (1 ¡ °)tH
= ¼n:







(ii) Four conditions that determine the area where both equilibria exist and the full separation
is more pro¯table are (2), N ¸ 6, (3) and (7). We ¯rst show that (2) and (7) are not mutually
exclusive. Condition (2) can be re-written as
tL
°tL + (1 ¡ °)tH
>





and (7) is equivalent to
tL
°tL + (1 ¡ °)tH
< °:
Thus in order for (2) and (7) to be consistent with each other it is necessary and su±cient that





The numerator of the LHS is a strictly decreasing function and the denominator is strictly increas-
ing. Thus the LHS is a strictly decreasing function. The RHS is a strictly increasing function and
LHS=RHS when ° = 1. Thus the inequality holds for any ° < 1:
The next step is to show that for any N there are parameter values for which (2) and (3) are
























31At the same time (2) becomes tH=tL < 1 as ° ! 1. When ° = 1 these two conditions are
consistent with each other. By continuity they are also mutually consistent for values of ° that are
close to 1. Thus, for any N ¸ 6 the set de¯ned by (2), (3) and (7) is not empty.
(iii) To prove this part, we will proceed in two steps. We start by ¯nding conditions under
which pps is higher than pn, and then using Proposition 5 we will show that under these conditions






°tL + 4(1 ¡ °)tH
stLtH >
stLtH







(1 ¡ °)NtH + °tH > °tL + 4tH
, tL°(N ¡ 2) > tH(°(N ¡ 2) ¡ (N ¡ 8)):
The RHS is positive whenever ° > N¡8
N¡2. For the partial equilibrium to exist it has to be the case
that ° > N¡4
N¡2 so the RHS is positive whenever the partial separation equilibrium exists. Thus,





°(N ¡ 2) ¡ (N ¡ 8)
: (19)








°(N ¡ 2) ¡ (N ¡ 4)
: (20)





°(N ¡ 2) ¡ (N ¡ 4)
>
°(N ¡ 2)




(N ¡ 8) >
°
2
(N ¡ 2) ¡ (N ¡ 4)
, N > °(N ¡ 2);
which always holds since ° · 1.
Thus, whenever the equilibrium with partial separation exists its price pps is less than the price
without the opaque agency pn. Moreover, in the former case some customers are charged marginal
cost whereas in the latter case all customers pay price pn. Thus hotel's pro¯t is higher in the
equilibrium without the opaque agency.¥
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